

VZCZCXRO8734
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0477/01 1581556
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071556Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5364
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000477

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2017

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [CH](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: CHAD: FOREIGN MINISTER ON REBELS AND PEACEKEEPING

Classified By: Ambassador Marc Wall for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with the Ambassador June 7, Foreign Minister Allam-Mi said that both Sudan and Chad were adequately abiding by the Riyadh accord's requirement to rein in each other's rebels. Greater calm had prevailed in eastern Chad as a result. Allam-mi hardened his verbiage opposing a large UN peacekeeping force in Chad. Chad wished to see, instead, a beefing up of existing Chadian and French capabilities. (He was not sure of the proposals which the French foreign minister would be bringing on his impending trip to Chad.) Allam-Mi was not favorable toward the Ambassador's request to permit movement of SLM rebels through Chad to a reconciliation meeting in Nairobi. Allam-Mi did not believe the principal antagonists in SLM could be brought back together no matter how much effort was expended. In his view, moving Sudanese rebels through Chad would complicate Chad's relations with Sudan; instead, their movement should be facilitated through the AU in Darfur. End summary.

¶2. (U) The Ambassador met Foreign Minister Ahmat Allam-Mi June 7, with poloff as notetaker. Allam-Mi, recently returned from Libya, joked that the Libyans were nervous about the Americans' establishing a base in Chad. Apparently, the Libyans had heard about small American expeditionary groups involved in bilateral training programs and been alarmed that a new U.S. African command had been set up, needing a forward base. (In Chad!)

Calmer in the East

¶3. (C) Allam-Mi said that the Sudanese-Chadian reconciliation effort in Riyadh had produced favorable results, as both sides were reining in each other's rebels. Sudan had tried to overthrow the Chadian government, it had failed, and perhaps it had begun to learn a lesson. Information coming to Ndjamena from Sudan was contradictory -- some suggesting the Sudanese had arrested Chadian rebel leaders, some suggesting it was continuing to support them -- but Chad was for the moment content to believe that Sudan was reining them in, since Chadian rebel attacks had diminished. Moreover, attacks by the Janjaweed into Chad had subsided in recent weeks.

¶4. (C) For its part, Allam-Mi said, Chad had ordered Sudanese rebel leaders, including the JEM's Khalil Ibrahim, to leave Chad and had advised them to go to Asmara to negotiate an end to the Darfur crisis. Khalil had never been a "friend" of Chad, in fact causing Chad as much trouble as Sudan, able to spend ample funds provided by Hasan al-Turabi. But Chad would use him again if Sudan "bothered" Chad again. The Sudanese, in Allam-Mi's view, tended to overemphasize Khalil Ibrahim and other Zaghawan rebels and did not pay enough attention to the Fur, Masalit, and other Darfurian ethnicities. They claimed that they did not have control over the Chadian rebels but then seemed able to rein them in when they wanted to. Notably, Sudan had done nothing to rein

in Mahamat Nour, the Tama rebel who was now Minister of Defense -- he had come in on his own, with no stimulus from Sudan.

Unwilling for SLM to Pass through Chad

15. (C) The Ambassador said that the United States was hoping to organize a reconciliation conference in Nairobi of SLM leaders, through the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, and sought Chadian agreement on their passage through Chad. Allam-Mi replied that Chad did not wish to see a multiplication of efforts to unify the Darfurian rebels. There already existed a process through the African Union and UN, to which the United States had subscribed, with venues already proposed in Juba, Eritrea, and Libya. The Ambassador underlined that the United States completely supported that process and the Nairobi conference would strengthen it. Allam-Mi demurred, insisting that transporting rebels through Chad was not the way to strengthen the process. Sudan would see an anti-Sudan plot. If the rebels needed to be transported, the way to do it was via the African Union mission in Darfur (e.g., al-Fasher or Tine) under an agreement with Sudan. In any case, Allam-mi said, he doubted that the principal antagonists within the SLM could be brought together. It would be better to accept from the start that there would be at least two SLM groups (under Minni Minnawi and Abd al-Wahid) and probably others.

No UN Force in the East but Maybe the French

16. (C) The Ambassador asked Allam-Mi's current view on a peacekeeping force in eastern Chad. Allam-Mi said that the Arab states were very sensitive on this issue. In any case,

NDJAMENA 00000477 002 OF 002

it was not necessary to follow the hugely expensive and time-consuming route, so preferred by the UN, of setting up a large UN force of 10-20,000 troops. Chad had offered a memorandum, when the subject first arose, laying out a sensible plan for improving existing forces on the ground, police, gendarmes, and army, which should be protected from the air. The Libyan-Eritrean border monitors now being established and the African Union stations in Abeche and Tine could also make a contribution to security in eastern Chad. Finally, the French, with their aremd presence in Abeche, should make a greater contribution. But so far, with all the focus on a grand scheme, there had been no start on the more realistic Chadian proposal. Establishing such a peacekeeping force in the Central African Republic was, however, acceptable to Chad -- "tomorrow, if they like." With a relatively narrow border with northern Sudan, CAR's security problem was more easily addressed with a peacekeeping force.

17. (C) Allam-Mi said he was not clear what the new French foreign minister had in mind in the way of enhanced forces and humanitarian corridors, but it would be revealed in his imminent visit. Allam-Mi said that the French already had a significant presence in Abeche, so the questions now were whether France was willing to do more -- give those forces fuller scope, intergrate with Chadian forces, and put more resources at Chad's disposal? In sum, Allam-Mi said, it was best to build on capabilities that were already present, and proceed in measured steps.

WALL